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Judicial Control of Systemic Inadequacies in
Federal Administrative Enforcement
Attacks on federal administrative action historically have consisted
of individual challenges to particular agency decisions.1 Recent cases,
however, have confronted courts with more general challenges to
federal agency enforcement policies and practices. 2 The plaintiffs in
1. See, e.g., FTC v. Universal Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244 (1967) (action challenging
cease and desist order); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 908 (1973) (action seeking review of agency determination that construction of
jail would not significantly affect environment). In cases in which courts have held such
decisions reviewable and found agency action inadequate or improper, they have typ-
ically granted only limited relief. See, e.g., East Oakland-Fruitvale Planning Council
v. Rumsfeld, 471 F.2d 524, 534 (9th Cir. 1972) (requiring Office of Economic Opportunity
to reconsider state executive's veto of project funding, although ultimate OEO decision
beyond review); Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co., 444 F.2d 1064, 1065 (5th Cir.
1971) (reversing lower court order "summarily" directing union election to be held,
ordering instead only investigation by National Labor Relations Board).
2. See White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978)
(challenging general delay in processing of Social Security disability appeals); Nader
v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (challenging 'epartment of Justice policy of
bringing prosecutions under Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit- III, 43
Stat. 1070 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18 U.S.C.) (repealed 1974), only in cases re-
ferred by Congress); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)
(challenging alleged Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) policy of
not enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970)); Hoff-
man-LaRoche, Inc. v. Weinberger, 425 F. Supp. 890 (D.D.C. 1975) (challenging Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) policy of permitting marketing of generic drugs without
approved new drug applications); Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn. 1973)
(challenging Secretary of Agriculture's termination of emergency loan program); Amer-
ican Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1972) (challenging FDA
failure to conduct drug efficacy reviews within statutory time framework); Adens v.
Sailer, 312 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (challenging agency practice of disbursing Social
Security emergency welfare checks by centralized mailing procedure rather than by
hand).
The courts in Nader and Adams expressly drew the distinction between challenges to
individual agency decisions and challenges to the general enforcement policies and
practices of agencies. See Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (complaint
does not ask court "to assume the essentially Executive function of deciding whether a
particular . . . violat[ion] should be prosecuted" but only seeks "a conventionally
judicial determination of whether certain fixed policies . . . lie outside the constitu-
tional and statutory limits of 'prosecutorial discretion' "); Adams v. Richardson, 480
F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (suit not brought to challenge HEW decisions
in "a few" cases, but to challenge "consciously and expressly adopted ...general policy
which is in effect an abdication of . . . statutory duty"). Such a distinction has also
been recognized in the scholarly literature. See J. MASHAW & R. MEPRILL, INTRODucTiON
TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC Lw SYSTEt 882 (1975); cf. Chayes, Tile Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1976) (outlining model of "public law"
litigation and contrasting it with traditional adjudicatory model of dispute resolution
between private parties); Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litiga-
tion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428 (1977) (emphasizing differences in judicial remedial activity
between private litigation and "public law" litigation).
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these cases have alleged "systemic enforcement inadequacies," that is,
fundamental failures in statutory implementation affecting significant
numbers of beneficiaries. 3 Specifically, the plaintiffs have alleged either
nonenforcement of all or part of a congressional mandate4 or significant
delay in its administration. 5 The cases illustrate the variety of causes of
these systemic inadequacies: refusal to spend appropriated funds," mis-
interpretation of statutory duty,7 inefficiency in administration,s and
insufficiency of appropriations. 9
Two recent suits alleging systemic inadequacies in statutory enforce-
ment by federal agencies are of particular interest, because they involve
major national priorities and programs and because the courts entered
unusually broad injunctive relief against the agencies. In Adams v.
Richardson,'0 the District of Columbia Circuit confronted a claim
that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) had
completely failed to enforce certain civil rights statutes."' In White v.
3. This definition is intended to embrace all agency failures to give full effect to
substantive congressional mandates. Systemic enforcement inadequacies may result from
policy choices made by agencies or from the insufficiency of available enforcement
resources. See pp. 423-27 infra.
4. See, e.g., Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (alleging total nonenforce-
ment of corrupt practices legislation); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (en banc) (alleging nonenforcement of that part of Title VI covering racial
discrimination).
5. See, e.g., White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908
(1978) (alleging delay in administration of Title II of Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 401-429 (1970)); American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C.
1972) (alleging delay in implementation of 1962 amendments to Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1976)).
6. See, e.g., Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
7. See, e.g., Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Weinberger, 425 F. Supp. 890 (D.D.C. 1975).
8. See, e.g., White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908
(1978); American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1972). But
see pp. 426-27 infra (other interpretations possible in both cases).
9. See, e.g., Adams v. Califano, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 1977) (order recognizing
failure of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to obtain full resources needed by
HEW, deeming HEW not in violation of order's enforcement provisions to extent all
available resources optimally utilized).
10. 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
I. Adams was originally a class action by black plaintiffs complaining of an HEW
policy of nonenforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1970), with respect to school districts in 17 Southern and border states. See Adams v.
Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1972), enforced, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C.), modified
and aff'd, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc). HEW attempted to justify its failure
to commence enforcement proceedings against noncomplying school districts "on the
grounds that it [was] still seeking voluntary compliance through negotiation and con-
ciliation." 351 F. Supp. at 638. The district court, however, found that "[t]he time
permitted by Title VI for securing voluntary compliance . . . ha[d] long since passed,"
and ordered the agency to commence enforcement proceedings within two months. 356
F. Supp. at 95. HEW was similarly ordered to commence enforcement proceedings against
a large number of school districts that the agency had previously found to be in presump.
tive violation of Supreme Court desegregation decisions and to demand from another
large number of school districts an explanation of racial disproportionalities in apparent
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Mathews,12 the Second Circuit faced a challenge to the delay-ridden
administration of Social Security disability benefits. 13 Both courts
found a violation of the agencies' enforcement duties and issued de-
violation of those decisions. Id. at 97. The remedial order was affirmed, with slight
modifications, by a unanimous Court of Appeals sitting en banc. Adams v. Richardson,
480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Subsequently, further relief was sought and obtained when it became clear that HEW
was not enforcing Title VI with respect to school districts that were not covered by the
previous order, but that had apparently begun to violate Supreme Court desegregation
decisions. Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269 (D.D.C. 1975), modified sub nom.
Adams v. Mathews, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C. July 17, 1975). The court once again ordered
the agency to require a large number of districts to rebut or explain the substantial
racial imbalance in them. More significantly, however, the court entered a general order
concerning "[fluture HEW [c]ompliance with Title VI." Id. at 273. The court also afforded
an important expansion of relief by ruling that "HEW has a duty to commence prompt
enforcement activity upon all complaints or other information of racial discrimination
in violation of Title VI." Id. Finally, the court set particular time frameworks for the
agency to follow in acting on complaints. Id.
Thereafter HEW began responding to complaints by women and Mexican-Americans
of discrimination on the basis of sex (in violation of Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976)) and national origin (in violation of
Title VI) by stating that it could not investigate them because, pursuant to the court's
order in Adams, it was devoting "a major portion" of its resources to handling race dis-
crimination complaints. See, e.g., Letter from John A. Bell, Chief, Elementary and
Secondary Education Branch, Region VI, Office for Civil Rights of HEW, to Ms. Kay
Paul Whyburn (Nov. 20, 1975) (copy on file with Yale Law Journal). Women's and
Mexican-American groups soon intervened in the litig. on. See Adams v. Mathews, 536
F.2d 417, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (women held "entitled to intervene . .-. as of
right"); Adams v. Mathews, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 1976) (Mexican-Americans
granted leave to intervene). The question of limited resources then became prominent.
The issue was never resolved by the court, however, because a settlement was negotiated
among the parties. The settlement was entered by the court in 1976 as an order
modifying that section of its supplemental order of 1975 concerning "[fluture HEW
[c]ompliance with Title VI." Adams v. Mathews, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C. June 14, 1976).
This 1976 order provided: that all Title VI and Title IX complaints were to be
handled within specified time frameworks, id. 8; that the Director of the Office for
Civil Rights could, on a temporary basis and by region, authorize exceptions not exceed-
ing 20% of the complaints received if he determined that the resources in any region
were inadequate, id. 11(a); and that complaints should be selected for exception by
subject category (race, sex, or national origin) in proportion to the number of such
complaints received in the preceding year, id. ( 11(c), 21. The order also provided
that all compliance reviews be handled within similar specified time frameworks. Id. 14.
HEW failed to comply with the 1976 order. In an order published in October 1977,
the court found that HEW had not taken all possible steps to use available resources and
to secure additional resources in order to comply with the 1976 order. The court therefore
directed HEW to indicate to OMB what resources were lacking and to take all steps
necessary with OMB to obtain them. Adams v. Califano, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C. Oct. 26,
1977). HEW complied, but OMB forwarded to Congress a request for only slightly more
than half the additional resources sought by HEW. Shortly thereafter another settle-
ment was negotiated and entered as an order by the court. Adams v. Califano, No. 3095-
70 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 1977). The order stated that HEW was not to be considered in
violation to the extent that it fully utilized available resources. Id. vi. The order
reserved the possibility, however, that "other defendants" could be sued, id., OMB ap-
parently being the likely candidate. Furthermore, the order's substantive provisions were
made applicable to the entire nation rather than merely the 17 Southern and border
states covered by the court's previous orders. Id. v. See generally pp. 423-25 infra.
12. 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
13. See pp. 427-29 infra.
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tailed "enforcement injunctions,"'14 that is, injunctions significantly
redirecting the agency's enforcement effort.' 5 Yet neither opinion pro-
vides the theoretical framework necessary to guide judicial responses to
complaints of systemic enforcement inadequacies.
This Note argues that the exercise of broad remedial powers by
courts is often appropriate to correct systemic inadequacies in federal
administrative enforcement efforts.', The Note develops a legal frame-
work to direct courts in the exercise of their power to issue enforce-
ment injunctions against federal agencies. Part I advances a standard
to guide courts in determining when and to what extent to go beyond
declaratory orders and actively engage in constructing a remedy.' 7
Under the proposed standard, the remedy in each case is determined
by evaluating the likelihood of "substantial noncompliance" and the
14. It is useful to compare with this category of injunctions the taxonomy advanced in
0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 1 (1972). Professor Fiss distinguishes among three types: preventive,
regulatory, and structural injunctions. "A preventive injunction tries to stop a discrete
event or act." Id. A regulatory injunction contains "a general prohibition" and is used
"to regulate a party's behavior over a long period of time." Id. A structural injunction
"alter[s] or reorganiz[es] some institutional arrangement." Id. It is the structural injunc-
tion that is most similar to the enforcement injunction. An enforcement injunction may
be a structural injunction; at a minimum, it is a "structural injunction" with respect to
some significant segment of the agency it addresses. Thus, much of Fiss's analysis of
structural injunctions applies with equal force to enforcement injunctions. See, e.g.,
p. 412 infra.
15. See pp. 423-25, 427-29 infra.
16. This Note is concerned only with challenges to federal administrative enforce-
ment policies and practices, although much of its analysis is clearly applicable to actions
by state and local entities as well. On the state and local level, federalism, rather than
the separation of powers, operates as a limitation on the breadth of federal judicial
remedies.
This Note is also concerned exclusively with allegations of inadequate statutory en-
forcement rather than with claims of agency failure to "enforce" constitutional provi-
sions. It is a semantic sleight of hand to describe statutory enforcement schemes that are
violative of the Constitution as failures by the agency to "enforce" the relevant constitu-
tional provisions. Such a description obscures the primary concern of statutory enforce-
ment actions by confusing the enforcement issue with the separable issue of the validity
of the underlying enactment. If the enforcement violates the Constitution, either the
enforcement is improper or the statute is invalid.
Finally, the Note is not concerned with cases that involve exclusively procedural, rather
that substantive, attacks on agency enforcement policies and practices. Examples include
cases involving attacks on processes of formal and informal rulemaking, see, e.g., Mobil
Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and cases involving agency choice of
mode of action, see, e.g., NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952).
Admittedly the line between substance and process is not always a sharp one, see Rosen-
blatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J.
243, 261-63 (1978) (discussing how seemingly procedural reforms produce substantive
changes); individuals may be considered as having separate substantive rights to participate
in agency policymaking when the statute so provides. Complaints concerning particular
agency decisions about the process by which a general policy is to be adopted are,
however, clearly analogous to traditional rather than systemic actions and so will not be
considered here.
17. A declaratory order is a minimal remedy that is almost always appropriate in the
context of systemic enforcement inadequacies and is, other things being equal, usually
to be preferred. See pp. 417-18 infra. It thus constitutes the baseline relief.
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nature of the "group right," the right shared in common by the
statutory beneficiaries. Part II applies the standard to several major
cases involving challenges to general enforcement policies and practices
of federal agencies. Part III explores the implications of the proposed
standard, pointing to limiting principles that make it workable and
noting its various benefits.
I. A Suggested Remedial Standard
As government has grown in recent years in response to mounting
social and legal demands, the task of administering legislative man-
dates has become increasingly complex, and the failure of agencies to
fulfill congressional objectives has become both increasingly common
and increasingly severe. Perhaps because these fundamental failures of
statutory enforcement have become critical, courts have shown a
greater willingness to attempt to remedy them. That the courts are
the appropriate bodies to provide the needed remedy is apparent for
several reasons. First, the political branches are frequently incapable of
fulfilling this role adequately. Executive self-regulation and congres-
sional oversight are ineffective means of grappling with these funda-
mental or "systemic" enforcement inadequacies.' 8 Second, the problem
18. Normally the good faith willingness of agencies to obey the law ensures com-
pliance with important congressional dictates. Agency self-regulation, however, is more
limited when the problem involves systemic failure of enforcement. First, when
pervasive institutional bad faith lies at the basis of the systemic inadequacy, agency self-
review is likely to be infected by the same bad faith. Cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189, 201-03 (1973) (evidence of bad intent in some institutional actions creates
presumption that bad intent has infected other institutional actions). Second, internal
agency checks will often not detect honest mistakes of law and inefficiency in administra-
tion. See M. CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON 195 (1964); cf. F. ROURKE,
BURAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 148 (1969) ("executive agencies find difficulty
in shifting their sights when past policies are no longer appropriate'). The recurring
instances of administrative misfeasance and malfeasance are evidence' enough of the
frequent inadequacy of efforts by federal agencies to police themselves. See, e.g., Delays
in Social Security Appeals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Social Security Hearings]; SENATE SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 91ST CONG., lsT SEss., REPORT ON CONGRESSIONAL OVERsIGHT OF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE AGENCIES (NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD) (Comm. Print 1970). Furthermore,
even when such inadequacies are detected, agencies are normally slow to act to correct
the problem. This "bureaucratic stasis" has been commonly noted as a prominent feature
of large administrative agencies. See, e.g., F. ROURKE, supra, at 148-49 ("bureaucratic
inertia").
Congressional oversight is also inherently limited in its ability to detect and rectify
systemic enforcement inadequacies. See T. HENDERSON, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF
ExEcUTIvE AGENCIES 2 (1970) ("[C]ongressional oversight . .. is carried out within rela-
tively isolated policy compartments centered in the various committees .... "); id. at
73-74 ("Mhe relationship between the information [Congress] obtains [in its oversight
role] and policy output.., is erratic at best, and, more often than not, nonexistent ....
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of systemic enforcement inadequacies is well-suited to judicial resolu-
tion. 19 Suits alleging systemic enforcement inadequacies present more
questions of law than they do of fact. Finally, courts are vested with
power to formulate effective remedies such as the enforcement injunc-
tion, an order that refocuses or reorganizes in some detail an agency's
enforcement effort. 20 Courts in the last few decades have made in-
creasing use of similar injunctions under their powers to fashion ap-
propriate remedies for violations of federal rights.21 The injunction, it
has been argued, no longer occupies a subordinate position in the
[It will remain so] [u]nless that system undergoes a fundamental change, which is highly
unlikely .... "); Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on
Three Doctrines, LAw & CONTE.IP. PROB., Summer, 1976, at 46, 56 n.41. Despite some in-
creased congressional concern over inadequate enforcement, see, e.g., Social Security Heal -
ings, supra, oversight is still used infrequently. See Pearson, Oversight, A Vital Yet Nc-
glected Function, 23 KAN. L. REv. 277, 288 (1974). In addition, even to the extent Congress
actually addresses the legal problems of agency inaction, its answers are not definitive.
Congress may only modify its prior enactments by the processes of amendment and
repeal, and has no power to validate agency inaction by announcing restrictive in-
terpretations of statutory requirements. For the purposes of statutory interpretation,
statements of Congress subsequent to the enactment are of limited probative value. See
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 268-69 (1965); United States v. Price,
361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) ("the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for
inferring the intent of an earlier one").
19. See pp. 430-32 infra. When challenges to agency inaction present major issues
of statutory interpretation, the courts are particularly appropriate forums. Resolution of
such questions of law and determination of the rights of groups and individuals are the
traditional functions of the courts. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
It is, moreover, inappropriate to refer complainants back to the political process when
the gist of their complaint is the inadequacy of that process. Plaintiffs in actions
alleging inadequate agency enforcement come into court having initially won in the
political arena: their complaint is simply that of executive failure to enforce the rights
they have won. There is no basis in precedent or reason for requiring such plaintiffs to
return to the political forum and seek renewed recognition of their rights, probably
under more difficult circumstances. In fact, judicial protection should be guaranteed to
plaintiffs whose effective use of the political process has been frustrated or denied. See
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-69 (1973) (invalidating multimember election dis-
tricts in light of history of political discrimination against black and Mexican-American
residents); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (invalidating state welfare
statute establishing long residency qualification for aliens; aliens termed "'discrete and
insular' minority" for whom "heightened judicial solicitude" appropriate).
20. See note 14 supra. When systemic enforcement inadequacies are alleged, equitable
relief rather than monetary damages is appropriate. See D. DoBns, REMiEIEs 57-58 (1973)
(legal remedy is usually inadequate when plaintiff is deprived of entitlement, if he
would need multiple suits to effectuate legal remedy, if he is entitled to some per-
formance by defendant, or if damages are so speculative that a monetary award is likely
to be inadequate).
21. See 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTs INJUNCTION 4 (1978) (increasing use of structural
injunction). Although it first gained "a special prominence" in the early civil rights
cases, id., the injunction soon became commonplace in "litigation involving electoral
reapportionment, mental hospitals, prisons, trade practices, and the environment," id. at
4-5. Indeed, these developments constitute a revolution in our remedial jurisprudence.
See id. at 1-5.
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remedial hierarchy.22 Moreover, specific congressional enactments sup-
port the use of extensive remedies in the context of systemic enforce-
ment inadequacies.
23
In determining the appropriate response in cases alleging systematic
agency failure to enforce federal statutes adequately, the court should
make three inquiries. First, the court must determine whether there is
a systemic enforcement inadequacy that would justify consideration of
some form of equitable relief. If such an inadequacy is found to exist,
the court should gauge the need for some form of enforcement injunc-
tion, in accordance with the standard proposed in this Note. Under
this standard, the court should evaluate the nature of the group right
involved and the likelihood that the agency will solve the problem
with minimal judicial supervision. Finally, the court should choose the
detail appropriate for the initial order in light of the urgency of the
remedial need.
A. Determination of "Systemic Inadequacy"
When faced with an allegation of a systemic enforcement inadequacy,
the court must first establish whether there exists a violation that
22. Id. at 1-6; see Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 994, 1020
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
23. Some commentators have suggested that the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1391(e) (1970) (amended 1976), which extended power "in the nature of
mandamus" to compel governmental officials to perform duties, was not intended to
carry forward the awkward limitations of traditional common law mandamus-namely the
sterile ministerial-discretionary distinction. See, e.g., Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the
Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Ad-
ministrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REv. 308, 319-20 (1967). In any event, the amendments
are of special importance for actions alleging systemic enforcement inadequacies, since
such actions allege duties more ministerial than discretionary in nature. See, e.g., Adams
v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (consistent failure to en-
force statute "a dereliction of duty"); American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, 349
F. Supp. 1311, 1316 (D.D.C. 1972) (agency enforcement sought "purely a ministerial
duty"). Furthermore, 1976 legislation, Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90
Stat. 2721 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)), abolished the amount-in-controversy re-
quirement for actions against federal officials, thus providing further evidence of con-
gressional support for extensive judicial remedial power in this area. The House Report
stressed the importance, despite the earlier passage of the Mandamus and Venue Act, of
extending the availability of "[t]he more traditional exercise of injunctive and declaratory
authority." H.R. REP. No. 91-1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976), reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6121. Finally, § 10(e)(1) of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1976), contemplates specific and affirmative judicial remedies: the
provision states that a reviewing court "shall compel agency action unlawfully withheld
or unreasonably delayed." Although the legislative history of this particular provision
is unilluminating, see S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), the clear import of the
language suggests that it was intended to embrace systemic as well as nonsystemic non-
enforcement and delay.
There is also broad policy support for the use of extensive remedies in the context of
systemic enforcement inadequacies. See pp. 433-35 infra.
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justifies judicial remedial action. The two initial determinations that
the court must make are whether the enforcement is "inadequate" and
whether the inadequacy is "systemic."
1. "Inadequate" Enforcement
In determining whether enforcement is inadequate, the court must
first determine what congressional goals are embodied in the statute.
This involves some assessment of congressional intent to grant rights
to enforcement. The court must then determine whether and to what
extent the agency has met these goals. In Adams, for example, the
court found that HEW had violated "Congress's clear statement of an
affirmative enforcement duty" when it failed to use the coercive power
specifically given the agency in the statute.
2 4
The determination of congressional intent will rarely prove to be
easy. The discrepancy between the absolute language of substantive
statutes and the limited enforcement budgets provided by subsequent
appropriations bills 25 presents difficult questions for courts confronted
with allegations of inadequate agency enforcement. Arguably, in-
dividuals have no right to enforcement efforts greater than those
achievable under existing appropriations bills, no matter what the
language of the underlying statute. 6 When limited appropriations
24. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
25. Rights granted us are often cast in absolute terms, but our commitment to these
ideals is in fact limited. This is nowhere more evident than in the enforcement ap-
propriations process. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970),
for example, prohibits in bold terms federal funding of, inter alia, any educational in-
stitution practicing racial discrimination. Annual HEW appropriations, however, contain
only specific amounts for the enforcement of Title VI with respect to educational in-
stitutions.
26. This position was adopted in dicta in Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1166
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc), but was rejected in White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). The White court found the statutory enforce-
ment inadequate despite the fact that existing appropriations were fully and optimally
utilized. See pp. 427-29 infra; cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 166-67 (1974) (Powell,
J., concurring) (statutory entitlement not limited in its creation by instrument providing
only narrow procedural protections). But cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 (1976)
(distinguishing Arnett and holding, on particular facts, no entitlement created when
instrument set forth narrow procedures).
Undoubtedly part of the reason the White court rejected the proposition that the
statutory right was limited by the enforcement appropriation was the possibility, in that
case, of affording relief under the existing statutes. Appropriations for benefits pay-
ments, the specific appropriations involved in White, are handled somewhat differently
from appropriations for program administration: a large fund is created from which pay-
ments in any year can be drawn, to be replenished by additional appropriations in sub-
sequent years. See 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1970 & Supp. VI 1976). There is in effect an "appro-
priations lag." Thus, the White court was able simply to order the agency to speed up
its appeals processing-leaving the agency to figure out how to do it-or begin making




reflect a congressional intent to curtail the prior mandate, this argu-
ment would probably be valid. For example, a shifting political climate
or external contingencies might impel Congress to reorder national
priorities, and this might be reflected in diminished appropriations.
Often, however, it is apparent that limited budgets do not indicate a
congressional intent to curtail the entitlements previously created. In
many cases, the discrepancy between the actual appropriations and the
necessary funds is attributable in part to an inability on the part of
Congress to anticipate expenses27 and in part to an understandable
desire to underestimate administrative costs in order to maintain that
degree of tension conducive to optimal efficiency in administration.
28
Moreover, since the appropriations process begins with the agency's
own suggestions and priorities, 29 lack of funds may sometimes reflect
the agency's, not Congress's, substantive judgment.
Because of the complexity of federal budgetary processes, however,
it is often difficult lo determine the extent to which limitations on ap-
propriations reflect substantive congressional judgments. Due to this
fact, as well as the significant potential for abuse that would exist
if an agency claim of inadequate resources were accorded preliminary
consideration in determining whether a prima facie violation exists, it
is more desirable for courts to consider such claims only at trial.
For jurisdictional purposes, inadequacy of enforcement should be
measured solely with respect to the substantive entitlement, irrespec-
tive of arguable limitations reflected in enforcement appropriations. If
at trial or during subsequent proceedings it becomes apparent that such
limitations do reflect substantive congressional judgments, the court
can modify its decree accordingly or relinquish jurisdiction al-
together.
30
27. See Hearings on Improving Congressional Budget Control Before the Joint Study
Comm. On Budget Control, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1973) (testimony of George Schultze);
Fisher, Presidential Spending Discretion and Congressional Controls, 37 LAw & CONTEMNI.
PROB. 135, 136, 150-52 (1972).
28. See H. LINDE & G. BUNN, LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES 335 (1976)
("The tension between the practical needs of administrative flexibility and the legisla-
tive desire to maintain policy control . . . is reflected . . . in contests over the choice
between 'line-items' and 'lump-sums' appropriations."); Miller, Separation of Powers: An
Ancient Doctrine Under Modern Challenge, 1976 DuKEz L.J. 299, 317 ("Congress . . . has
• . . routinely starved the regulatory arms of government-deliberately, it would
seem . . .)
29. See H. LINDE & G. BUNN, supra note 28, at 249-50, 253.
30. See, e.g., Adams v. Califano, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 1977) (modifying
previous decree to recognize limitation on available resources reflecting substantive high-
level executive judgment).
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2. "Systemic" Inadequacy
After deciding that an enforcement inadequacy exists, the court
must then determine whether the inadequacy is systemic. In so doing,
the court should look to the pervasiveness of the inadequacy, the
degree to which identifiable subclasses of beneficiaries are dispropor-
tionately affected, the nature of the agency policy or practice in
question, and the purposes of the underlying statute.
First, the fact that large numbers of people are directly affected by an
agency course of action not only suggests that there is a greater need
for meaningful relief, but also tends to indicate that the enforcement
scheme has an underlying defect of some generality.31 The enforce-
ment need not be inadequate with respect to all statutory beneficiaries,
however; a systemic inadequacy may exist when agency nonenforce-
ment or delay is directed toward one or more subclasses of bene-
ficiaries.
32
In addition to pervasive or systematically harmful agency inaction,
however, an agency policy or practice of a general nature is required
before the inadequacy can be considered systemic. The Food and Drug
Administration's decision to permit marketing of a particular drug, for
example, may affect millions of people, but the decision is usually far
removed from the basic statutory purposes and is linked instead to
particularized factual judgments. It thus reflects little about the
agency's general enforcement effort. Finally, the minimum nonenforce-
ment or delay actionable may vary with the purposes of the under-
lying statute;33 when the right involved is more important,3 4 courts
should be less tolerant of systematic agency inaction.
B. Determination of Remedial Need
After deciding that a systemic enforcement inadequacy exists, the
court must choose among the various remedial options by assessing the
gravity of the remedial need. The range of equitable remedies that a
court could enter includes a declaratory judgment and dismissal of the
case without further action,? a declaratory judgment in which the
31. See p. 434 infra.
32. Compare Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (initial
litigation involving only black plaintiffs) with Adams v. Califano, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C.
Dec. 29, 1977) (final settlement involving blacks, Mexican-Americans, women, and the
handicapped as plaintiffs).
33. Thus the nature of the group right may affect not only the degree of relief af-
forded, see pp. 418-20 infra, but also the initial determination of whether a violation
exists.
34. See p. 419 infra.
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
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court retains jurisdiction to require the agency to return periodically
and demonstrate compliance,36 an order to the agency to submit a
compliance plan for court approval,37 an order requiring the agency to
attc.npt to procure additional resources in order to further its enforce-
ment effort, 38 and, most importantly, an order to the agency to imple-
ment the court's own compliance plan.3 9 If the court decides to order
the implementation of its own compliance plan, it may enter a highly
detailed order or it may enter an order cast in more general terms,
leaving the agency with considerable discretion to select the means by
which compliance is effected.
Declaratory relief, at the very least, is almost always appropriate in
the context of systemic enforcement inadequacies, because the issues
generally involve "statutory interpretation uncluttered by factual dis-
putes" and are "purely federal" and "of major national consequence."' 40
Moreover, declaratory relief has historically been more readily provided
than has injunctive relief,41 in part because it is a less intrusive
36. See, e.g., Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269, 273 (D.D.C.), modified sub nom.
Adams v. Mathews, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C. July 17, 1975) (provision concerning "future
HEW compliance with Title Vr).
37. See 0. Fiss, sukra note 14, at 416; cf. Adams v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 636, 642
(D.D.C. 1972), affl'd, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (plaintiffs required t6 sub-
mit order "consistent with [court's] findings and conclusions" but also directed to "confer
with defendants on the wording and substance").
38. See, e.g., Adams v. Califano, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 1977).
39. Although often relying heavily on suggestions from either plaintiffs or defendants
or both, the court ultimately decides on the content of the order. An exercise of rela-
tively great court initiative took place in American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, No.
1847-70 (D.D.C. Oct. I1, 1972) (modification of initial order by court). See Developments,
supra note 22, at 1063. From the defendants' point of view, it makes little difference
whether the plan imposed was initially drafted by the plaintiffs or by the court.
The court's plan may be either a substantive compliance plan that directs the akency
to enforce particular policies or a procedural compliance plan that directs the agency to
utilize particular means in order to effect given statutory ends. Cf. Glazer, Should Judges
Administer Social Services?, 46 PUB. INThRES 64, 65 (1978) (distinguishing between in-
junctive orders with procedural and with substantive requirements).
40. Bradley v. Saxbe, 388 F. Supp. 53, 56 (D.D.C. 1974). Although the granting of de-
claratory relief is subject to the discretion of the court, the exercise of that discretion
must be sound and in the public interest. See 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRAcrCEc AND PROCEDURE § 2579, at 784 (1973). The Bradley court found that, in light of
the quoted factors, declaratory judgment was "appropriate in the public interest." 388 F.
Supp. at 56. Declaratory judgments have been entered when issues of large public im-
portance are at stake, notwithstanding competing prudential considerations. See, e.g.,
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969) (declaration that House of Representatives
could not exclude congressman).
41. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 122 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (considerations governing grant of declaratory judgment are "quite
different" from those governing injunctions); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254 (1967)
(court erred in refusing declaratory relief simply because injunction was inappropriate).
The injunction has been regarded as an extraordinary remedy, see 11 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 40, § 2942, at 368, while declaratory relief has been characterized as
"alternative or cumulative and not exclusive or extraordinary," FED. R. Civ. P. 57, Ad-
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remedy42 and in part because it has received specific congressional en-
dorsement. 43 On the other hand, the injunction has the added element
of coercion, based on the immediate availability of contempt for viola-
tion of its dictates. To be sure, if a defendant disobeys the declaratory
order, an injunction may then be sought against him, 4 but this would
involve additional delay. The injunction "gives the defendant one
more chance" to comply, while the declaratory order "gives the de-
fendant two more chances." 4a
In determining remedial need, the court should look to two major
factors. First, the court should consider the nature of the group right
impaired by the inadequate enforcement. Second, the court should
evaluate the likelihood of substantial agency noncompliance with a
declaratory order or an injunction of limited specificity.
1. Nature of the Group Right
In assessing the nature of the group right the court should first dis-
cern whether the plaintiffs are the "especial beneficiaries" of the statute
or merely ancillary ones.4 6 Whether a particular plaintiff is an especial
visory Committee Note. Rule 57 specifically provides that the availability of "another
adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it
is appropriate." In contrast, "historically, and even today, the main prerequisite to ob-
taining injunctihe relief is a finding that plaintiff is being threatened by some injury
for which he has no adequate legal remedy." II C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 40,
§ 2942, at 368-69.
42. See Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1148 (1977) (injunctions like the enforce-
ment injunction -are especially intrusive . . . [] introduc[ing] a dimension of supervision
and oversight not present with declaratory judgments"). Injunctions may also represent
greater symbolic intrusion, in the sense of expressing less respect for other governmental
units. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (courts should avoid expressing "lack
of respect" for other branches).
43. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1970). The injunction, on the other hand, has ex-
clusively equitable origins. See Beacon Theatres. Inc. v. Vestover, 359 U.S. 500, 509
(1959) ("[TJhe expansion of adequate legal remedies provided by the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act . . . necessarily affects the scope of equity. Thus . . . the need for, and there-
fore, the availability of such equitable remedies as . . . [the] [i]njunction must be con-
sidered in view of the existence of the Declaratory Judgment Act .... ") But see 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (limited congressional endorsement of injunction in area of civil rights
violations).
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970).
45. Fiss, supra note 42, at 1122.
46. The question is one of congressional intent. The inquiry is in fact closely analogous
to one adopted by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), to determine
whether an implied cause of action lies under a given statute. See id. at 78. However,
because of the greater unpredictability and potential for abuse that exists when courts
open the -floodgates" for private plaintiffs to bring suits in order to supplement the
agency enforcement effort, see National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 464-65 (1974) (denying implied cause of action in part because
of potential disruption of statutory scheme), the standards for implying congressional in-
tent in cases alleging systemic enforcement inadequacies are not as stringent as those for
implying a private right of action.
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beneficiary of a statute depends on the specificity with which Con-
gress desired to protect the right of the members of his class. The
court should ask not only whether relief seems consistent with con-
gressional purposes, but also how much relief seems consistent. 47
Next the court should consider the relative importance of the group
right.49 Greater relief would seem appropriate where constitutional
rights or "fundamental interests" 49 are implicated. s0 Quasi-constitu-
tional rights51-those created by statute to effectuate some constitu-
tional provision-should also merit careful consideration. In the realm
of pure statutory rights, liberty interests tend to be favored by courts, 2
as do certain property entitlements that are essential to a minimum
standard ot life.53 When the group right involved is important, pru-
dential considerations weighing against the issuance of a detailed en-
forcement injunction 4 will more often be outweighed by the in-
dividual and public interests at stake.
Finally, the court should consider the characteristics of the group
47. Cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975) (segregating issues of reviewability
and scope of review, based on congressional purposes).
48. Although courts have occasionally eschewed such analyses, they have nonetheless
engaged in them, if only to a limited extent. See, e.g., Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143,
152 (D. Minn. 1973) (emergency disaster relief too "important" a right to be left to
"whims" of administrator). Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (individual
entitled to evidentiary hearing before termination of welfare benefits) with Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-42 (1976) (individual not entitled to evidentiary hearing prior
to termination of Social Security disability benefits). Moreover, courts should be less
hesitant to undertake such assessments when, as here, they do so in the discretionary
context of determining the extent of the equitable relief to be afforded. See Gewirtz,
suPra note 18, at 77 n.126 ("courts assess the importance of policies in deciding whether
to grant equitable relief").
49. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (travel); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (voting).
50. Although agencies may have the power to make constitutional determinations in
the first instance, see Note, The Authority of Administrative Agencies to Consider the
Constitutionality of Statutes, 90 HARV. L. Rv. 1682 (1977), such is not their expertise,
and in any event there has, by hypothesis, already been an initial agency failure.
51. The term "quasi-constitutional right" is here used to refer to a right created by
a statute to effectuate some constitutional provision. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), which the plaintiffs sought to enforce in Adams v.
Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc), is an example. The statute may be
considered quasi-constitutional both because it seeks to effectuate a policy embodied in
the Fourteenth Amendment and because it seeks to avoid action in direct violation of
the Fifth Amendment. There is little doubt that by affirmatively channeling funds to
schools practicing racial discrimination the federal government would be violating the
prohibitions of the Fifth Amendment. The Adams case, then, presented a statutory claim,
but a claim of a very special nature. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (court
gives special deference to congressional attempt to effectuate Constitution).
52. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1267 (1975). But see
Lynch v. Household Fin. Co., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) ("the dichotomy between personal
liberties and property rights is a false one").
53. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
54. See pp. 430-33 infra.
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affected. The court should inquire into the number of people ad-
versely affected by the systemic enforcement inadequacy. When agency
inaction results in a greater total number of rights violations, there is a
more compelling justification for sweeping injunctive relief.5 In ad-
dition, the court should determine whether the agency inaction dis-
proportionately affects an identifiable minority. Where the agency
engages in a course of conduct that systematically disadvantages a
discrete group of statutory beneficiaries, a detailed enforcement in-
junction will probably be necessary.
2. Probable Substantial Noncompliance
The second major factor to be considered by courts in determining
the seriousness of the remedial need is the likelihood that the agency
will not comply with a declaratory order or injunction of limited
specificity. In cases in which there is a likelihood of noncompliance, the
historical preference for declaratory relief-6 must yield to the greater
coercive power and specificity of the enforcement injunction. The
greater intrusion on agency autonomy and expertise is justified when
such independence undermines legislative goals. The entry of a de-
tailed enforcement injunction is necessitated by the need for coercion
of a specific agency response.
These policies suggest what may be termed a "principle of probable
substantial noncompliance": to the extent that agency elimination of
enforcement inadequacies in response to a declaratory order is un-
likely, some form of mandatory injunction should be issued, and to
the extent that such elimination in response to a general injunction is
unlikely, a more detailed order should be issued.
The determination of probable substantial noncompliance involves
inquiries into the severity of and reasons for the enforcement in-
adequacy. The severity of the enforcement inadequacy is measured
along a continuum from full enforcement, to delay, to total nonenforce-
ment. Total nonenforcement presents a stronger case for broad relief
not merely because the deprivation of the group entitlement is more
complete but also because agency reform is more unlikely.57
The reasons for systemic enforcement inadequacies should be
derived from the full history of the agency's enforcement effort and
55. See p. 434 infra.
56. See pp. 417-18 supra.
57. See F. RoURKE, supra note 18, at 148-49; Rosenblatt, supra note 16, at 264-330 (case
studies showing resistance of agencies to consumer demands for enforcement of legislative
mandates).
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may include bad faith obstruction by the agency, agency error of law,
inefficiency in administration, or actual lack of funds.58 In whatever
form, bad faith on the part of the agency suggests that substantial non-
compliance would be highly probable with respect to all but the most
rigorously structured remedy. In such cases, the scope of agency dis-
cretion in statutory implementation is properly restricted. To the
extent that honest error of law is the cause of inadequate enforcement;
full compliance with a declaratory order can reasonably be expected,
although a serious lack of clarity in the law, coupled with the fact of
initial agency failure at implementation, may require a highly detailed
declaratory order.
Complete good faith or clear bad faith on the part of the agency
would usually be difficult to ascertain, however, and to that extent an
active judicial role would often be appropriate on a prophylactic
theory,", depending on the severity of the enforcement inadequacy and
the nature of the group right involved. Even in some cases of complete
good faith, such as cases involving simple administrative incompetence,
a declaratory order would be unlikely to remedy the enforcement in-
adequacy. A moderately detailed injunction may provide the needed
direction and impetus. Furthermore, some judicial role is possible even
when the agency enforcement effort is optimal and the inadequacy is
due solely to real limitations on available resources. In such cases a
court order may be useful in giving administrators greater leverage in
effectively requesting funds needed for adequate enforcement. 60
C. Construction of Remedial Orders
When a court finds that some form of injunctive relief from systemic
enforcement inadequacies is required, it must consider, in determining
the specificity of relief to be afforded, not only the remedial need but
also practical constraints that limit its ability to construct the in-
junction.
1. Specificity of the Initial Decree
The specificity of the initial decree depends in large part on the
court's evaluation of the remedial need, an evaluation based on the
agency's ability and willingness to eliminate the enforcement in-
58. See p. 408 supra.
59. But cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376 (1976) (broad prophylactic remedy in-
appropriate when no agency failure to fulfill a duty).
60. Cf. Glazer, supra note 39, at 70 (there is possibility of collusion at trial by ad-
ministrative defendants "hoping to get by judicial order what they could not get through
budgetary presentations to [the] executive and legislature').
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adequacy and the urgency of the problem as reflected by the nature of
the group right. The court should attempt to limit its decrees to gen-
eral guidelines that permit the agency to remedy the problem itself,
but more detailed enforcement injunctions are appropriate when sub-
stantial noncompliance is expected with decrees of lesser specificity or
when the loss of group rights is especially damaging.
In addition to the remedial need, the court should consider the
nature of the decisions that it must make in constructing a particular
remedy.61 In ordering relief, the court should attempt only such detail
in its decisions as can reasonably be derived from the statute and
supplemental regulations. The clarity and specificity of the substantive
statute thus directly affect the degree of detail appropriate in the
injunction.
2. Ongoing Remedial Modification: The Principle of "Phasing"
Under the standard proposed above, the nature of the agency's past
enforcement effort is an important determinant of the initial remedy.
Similarly, when the court orders injunctive relief or enters a declara-
tory judgment and retains jurisdiction, the nature of the agency's
response determines the court's subsequent action. To the extent that
the agency fails to comply with previous decrees, injunctions of in-
creasing specificity may be issued. The possibility of "phasing" de-
crees62 allows the court to give proper recognition to the need for
administrative flexibility and the presumably greater expertise of the
agency by issuing more general injunctions initially. Moreover, the
use of phasing allows courts to tailor their actions more closely to
remedial need and to preserve limited judicial resources. Phasing may
be an important tool when legal error or inefficiency in administration
is the basis of the inadequate enforcement; it is clearly inappropriate
when the agency has exhibited bad faith.
II. The Standard Applied
The principle set forth in this Note is that courts should use in-
creasingly detailed remedies for systemic enforcement inadequacies as
61. With respect to basic decisions allocating resources and structuring enforcement
priorities, the substantive statute provides the court with a concrete guide supplementing
the actual appropriations bill; such decisions are thus susceptible of judicial resolution.
The frequent lack of specificity in appropriations bills, rather than representing a delega-
tion of basic policy decisions to agencies, reflects congressional recognition of the need
for flexibility in the implementation of implicit statutory requirements.
62. See 0. Fiss, supra note 14, at 415-16 ("theory of gradualism"); Developments in the
Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133, 1247-50 (1977) ("incremental
approach" to "systemic" relief).
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the seriousness of the remedial need increases. Utider the proposed
standard, when the severity of the enforcement inadequacy and the
nature of the past enforcement effort indicate that the agency is un-
likely to respond adequately to limited remedial orders, more forceful
decrees become appropriate. Moreover, when the nature of the group_
right is especially pressing, the proposed standard would have courts
insist on greater certainty that the agency will respond appropri-
ately; this would generally entail initial imposition of more highly
detailed decrees than would otherwise be called for. The suggested
standard can be further elaborated by application to several major
cases.
A. Adams v. Richardson: Detailed Enforcement Injunction
Adams originally involved a challenge to a policy of virtually total
nonenforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.63 The
initial remedy in Adams was limited strictly to school districts then
in violation, although it was based on a finding that HEW's general
policy violated Title VI.64 Only after HEW continued this nonenforce-
ment policy with respect to new school districts did the court enter an
order directly addressing HEW's general enforcement duties under
Title VI;0  the order was short and merely imposed a time framework
and reporting requirements on the agency. Only after noncompliance
with that decree did the court enter its highly detailed order of 1976,
setting forth elaborate enforcement priorities and time frameworks. 6
Finally, after serious noncompliance with the 1976 plan, the court
acted in 1977 to require HEW to attempt to secure additional re-
sources from Congress through the Office of Management and Bud-
get (OMB). 7 HEW complied, but full funding from OMB was not
forthcoming.68 The court then modified its 1976 decree to recognize
the potential inadequacy of enforcement resources. 9
As it originally came before the court, Adams presented a situation
in which there was total nonenforcement of a quasi-constitutional
right,7 0 with a strong indication of deliberate abdication of statutory
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
64. See Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92, 95-96 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 480 F.2d 1159
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
65. See Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269, 273 (D.D.C. 1975).
66. See Adams v. Mathews, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C., June 14, 1976).
67. See Adams v. Califano, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C., Oct. 26, 1977).
68. Id.
69. Adams v. Califano, No. 3095-70 (D.D.C., Dec. 29, 1977). See generally note 11 supra.
70. See Adams v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 1159
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc); note 51 suPra.
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duty by the agency.71 Under the test proposed by this Note, such a com-
pelling remedial need suggests the desirability of early imposition of a
highly specific, court-devised remedy. The severity of the enforcement
inadequacy in the context of the bad faith that characterized the
agency's past enforcement effort indicated that substantial noncom-
pliance would be probable with respect to all but the most highly de-
tailed orders. The important and "especial" nature of the group right
72
made issuance of such an order all the more necessary.
The main criticism to be leveled against the court, therefore, is one
of excessive self-restraint. A phasing of remedies was chosen when
circumstances demanded more immediate action. The content of the
remedial order eventually filed in 1976 is, however, consistent with
principles advanced in this Note. In fashioning its plan, the court made
a number of major policy decisions,7 3 which might have been inappro-
priate and perhaps even intrusive in other contexts, but which were
justified and necessitated by the circumstances in Adams. For example,
the court emphasized complaint investigations over compliance reviews
as a means to effectuate the statutory mandate.7 4 Because complaints
may not accurately reflect the incidence of violations of rights, 75 com-
71. See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc); Adams
v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 636, 640 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(en banc) (dramatic decrease in number of enforcement proceedings initiated after new
Director of Office for Civil Rights assumed power).
72. In fact, each of the orders entered by the Adams court was substantially what the
plaintiffs had requested and furnished to the court. The fact that such plans were flawed
and too conservative does not reflect any inherent defect in systemic actions, however:
rather than being unrepresentative, the plaintiffs may simply have been too com-
promising and deferential to a perceived conservatism on the part of the court. What
the inadequacy of the plaintiffs' plans does indicate is that the court must always be an
independent judge of the appropriateness of any remedial plan, and must always be
willing to use its inherent equitable powers to fashion its own plan when that is
necessary.
73. The court's order included decisions regarding the amount of time allowed for
voluntary compliance before HEW should bring enforcement actions, the speed with
which each complaint would be handled, the manner in which complaints from different
minority groups should be handled, the relative priority given complaints and com-
pliance reviews, the emergencies and exceptions that would be recognized, and the
agency's interactions with OMB. See note 11 supra.
74. Although the court's order did not contain an express provision establishing a
preference for complaint investigations over compliance reviews, it implicitly entailed
such a preference. Apart from a special provision for Fiscal Year 1976, the order did not
specify how many compliance reviews HEW was to conduct, but only required that any
reviews initiated be completed within certain timeframes. See Adams v. Mathews, No.
3095-70, J 12-15 (D.D.C. June 14, 1976). The order did, however, require that all com-
plaints be investigated. See id. 8. The combined effect of these provisions was to reduce
the use of compliance reviews by HEW. Some enforcement resources were shifted to
complaint investigations, although not nearly enough for full compliance with the court's
order.
75. Some minority groups may tend to file more formal complaints than others. The
Mexican-American intervenors, for example, advanced the claim that Mexican-Americans
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pliance reviews may instead represent a more effective enforcement 76
machinery.77 Yet in light of the agency's bad faith, judicial insistence on
complete complaint investigation was the course most likely to result
in full enforcement.
The court's actions subsequent to the filing of the 1976 order are
consistent with the standard proposed in this Note. In the face of con-
tinued noncompliance with its 1976 order, the court forced HEW to
confront OMB with its budgetary needs. When OMB then reduced the
requested budget before forwarding it to Congress, the court backed
away somewhat, stating that HEW would not be "deemed in violation"
to the extent that it efficiently utilized available resources.78 The
court specifically reserved, however, the plaintiffs' right to bring in
other defendants79-OMB apparently being the likely candidate. Thus,
while giving some heed to the specific consideration of Title VI fund-
ing problems by high-level executive officials, the court implicitly
recognized that before a systemic inadequacy could definitively be said
not to exist, some specific congressional consideration might be
required.
B. American Public Health Association v. Veneman:
General Enforcement Injunction
American Public Health Association v. Veneman8 ° involved delay in
enforcement by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of the 1962
amendments to the Pure Food and Drug Act,81 which mandated
"efficacy reviews" for all marketed drugs. The statute was intended for
the especial benefit of members of the consuming public, and involved
important individual interests in personal health and privacy. The
delay in Veneman was serious, and the threatened delay more serious
are less likely than others to file such complaints when discriminated against. This claim
is supported by statistics demonstrating that far more complaints alleging sex discrimina-
tion are filed each year than are complaints alleging discrimination on the basis of
national origin. See Interview with Lawrence Velez, Office for Civil Rights, HEW (Oct.
11, 1978) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
76. Effective enforcement may not be the only legitimate goal. Investigation of all
complaints might be justified as increasing individuals' perceptions of governmental
responsiveness and augmenting their sense of personal importance.
77. Objective statistical evidence may be a more reliable guide than complaint filing
patterns. Moreover, the intuition of local administrators, which is another common
guide in initiating compliance reviews, is a factor that should not be disregarded.
78. See Adams v. Califano, No. 3095-70, vi (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 1977).
79. See id.
80. 349 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1972).
81. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (amending 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-393 (1976)).
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still.82 In addition, there was some indication that the agency had not
been acting in complete good faith.83 At best, there was serious legal
error accompanied by considerable inefficiency in administration.
These three factors-the implication of rights affecting personal health,
the egregiousness of the delay, and the questionable nature of the
agency's enforcement effort-suggest, under the test propounded in
this Note, that a moderately detailea injunction would have been
appropriate.
The court order actually entered in Veneman, however, did both too
little and too much. On the one hand, in imposing certain decisions in
the remedy it ordered, the Veneman court arguably made policy deci-
sions based on insufficient data and better left to the expertise of the
FDA. For example, the opinion, in setting review priorities, ordered
drugs with multiple uses to be given an overall efficacy rating equal to
the highest rating for any one of the drug's uses. The court might in-
stead have ordered that distinctions be drawn among uses, with some
uses labeled "effective" and others labeled "ineffective." 84 In view of
the FDA's "solicitude" for the drug industry, 3 however, there was
reason to believe that the agency would not have moved with sufficient
speed on its own. The court's plan thus offered a more effective en-
forcement scheme than the FDA seemed likely to develop.
On the other hand, the Veneman court was ultimately too cautious
in its demands on the agency. Its second order s6 cut back substantially
on the original remedy.8 7 In several instances the court granted the
agency considerable discretion to determine exceptions to the order's
requirements.88 Thus, the Veneman remedy became a de facto declara-
tory order.
82. 349 F. Supp. at 1316-17. The court termed it "intolerable procrastination." Id. at
1317 n.19.
83. The court spoke of the agency's "solicitude" for the drug industry. Id. at 1316
n.14. Also, the court's reference to the agency's "procrastination" suggests that the delay
may have been deliberate. Id. at 1317 n.19.
84. Under the court's final order, a drug that was ineffective as to its main use and
effective as to one of its incidental uses received the same review priority as a drug
that was effective as to all its uses. See American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, No.
1847-70, III (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 1972).
85. American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311, 1316 n.14 (D.D.C.
1972).
86. American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, No. 1847-70 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 1972).
87. American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, No. 1847-70 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 1972).
88. See American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, No. 1847-70, f, II (D.D.C. Oct. 11,
1972) (allowing defendants to determine "maximum extent feasible" to which available
resources could be utilized); id VIII (allowing defendants to make exceptions to review
priorities "where public health considerations or administrative efficiency justify such
action"); id. XIV (allowing defendants to permit some drugs to remain on market
pending efficacy studies where "compelling justification of .. .medical need" exists, if
justification is filed with court).
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C. White v. Mathews: Declaratory Judgment and Injunction To Seek
Funding
White concerned delay in the processing of Social Security disability
appeals, involving a statutory right of "especial benefit" to the plaintiff
class."" The court expressly noted the good faith of the agency in at-
tempting to enforce the statute in the face of a number of severe ex-
ternal strains,90 and the agency apparently recognized its legal duty to
provide timely hearings. 91 It is more difficult to discern whether ad-
ministrative inefficiency existed. Indeed, the court made no findings of
inefficiency, but instead recited numerous steps the agency had taken
to minimize delays. 9- The probable cause for the delays was therefore
insufficiency of resources, and there is some indication that the White
court so viewed the case.
93
89. This is true despite the Supreme Court's holding in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976), that disability recipients are not constitutionally entitled to a hearing
prior to the termination of their benefits. The standard for implying congressional intent
to afford relief from systemic enforcement inadequacies is clearly different from the due
process standard governing the provision of pretermination adversary hearings. In fact,
the Eldridge opinion itself recognizes the great importance of disability benefits to the
individual. And as the White court noted, "the absence of pre-termination hearings
makes it all the more important to expedite adjudication of claims of erroneous termina-
tion." White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 859 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
90. Id. at 859.
91. The agency agreed that a claimant was entitled to a hearing within a reasonable
time, and took steps to reduce delay, although it maintained that certain extenuating
circumstances justified considerable delay. The agency's failure to recognize a duty to
respond differently to the administrative problems that beset it, specifically its failure to
seek further resources, may well be considered legal error. However, the factor of over-
riding significance for the purpose of determining the basic remedy to be offered would
seem to be the nature of the agency action with respect to its present utilization of r6-
sources. The agency apparently correctly interpreted its duties in this regard. See id. at
858.
92. Id. at 859.
93. There was certainly no express finding of inefficiency. The district court did at
one point assert generally that the delay-reducing steps the agency had already taken
served to show "that improvements are possible." White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252,
1261 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
Although this could be taken as a finding that enforcement was not totally efficient, the
lack of a specific basis for the statement suggests that the court may have been merely
groping for some justification for judicial intervention.
The court did not specify how the agency was to comply with the time framework it im-
posed for appeals processing. There is some suggestion that the court viewed the enforce-
ment problem as stemming from a temporary deficiency in appropriations-a lag be-
tween changing demands for funds and the congressional response to those changing
demands-so that the only question concerned the proper course of action until enforce-
ment appropriations were updated. See 559 F.2d at 859 ("the question truly is . . . 'not
whether there shall be costs incurred, but who shall bear them while the governmental
machinery responsible for providing appeals puts itself in order' "). The court might
thus have fully intended that some prospective 'payments be made; it might have
realized that full compliance with the time framework would be impossible. The court
would have done well to have been more specific on this matter. Inherent in setting strict
time frameworks may be some policy determination regarding the process that individual
427
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Based on these findings the district court in White entered an en-
forcement injunction ordering the agency either to comply with certain
appeals processing time frameworks or begin making prospective pay-
ments to individuals whose petitions it could not consider in a timely
fashion.9 4 Yet under the test proposed in this Note, White presents a
far weaker case for a detailed initial injunction than does Adams: the
group right is less significant,9 the inadequacy consists only of delay,
and there is no evidence of bad faith or even of inefficiency. The court
in White should have granted a declaratory judgment stating plain-
tiffs' rights to speedier hearings, retained jurisdiction to require the
agency to return periodically and demonstrate compliance, and entered
an injunction calling for officials to seek additional funds from the
agency or from OMB.96 Such an order would remand the problem to
complaints should receive; at the very least the court's lack of clarity regarding the
extent to which compliance with the time framework was really expected and the means
by which it should be effected might foreseeably lead to agency revisions of individual-
process policy determinations.
94. White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); see Note, Administrative Delay in Providing
Hearings for Social Security Disability, 6 HoFs-rk L. REv. 565 (1978).
95. The individual interest in disability benefits, though substantial, is still not
quite as great as that in certain other statutory entitlements, Compare Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (individual entitled to evidentiary hearing prior to termina-
tion of welfare benefits) with Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (individual not
entitled to evidentiary hearing prior to termination of social security disability benefits).
Moreover, the right involved in Adams was a quasi-constitutional right of extraordinary
importance to the individual. See note 51 supra.
96. The White case can be profitably compared with Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676
(D.C. Cir. 1974), in which a declaratory judgment would also have been appropriate but
in which there was no need for an injunction to secure additional resources. Nader was
an action alleging a Department of Justice policy of essentially total nonenforcement of
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 18 U.S.C.) (repealed 1974), which "required candidates and com-
mittees supporting candidates for the Presidency, the Senate, and the House of Rep-
resentatives to file reports on campaign contributions and expenditures" with officers
of the Congress. 497 F.2d at 677. The policy adopted was that of initiating prosecutions
only in cases referred to the Department by Congress. Id. at 678. Although fundamental
interests of the plaintiffs were implicated-interests in voting and in the fairness of the
political process-the nonenforcement seems to have been the result of simple legal error
rather than bad faith. The policy had prevailed at the Department for decades, had
spanned numerous administrations, and was facially plausible in light of the statute's re-
quirement that reports be filed with Congress. Id. Moreover, although the plaintiff was
seeking only general enforcement of the statute, rather than particular prosecutions, the
unique nature of criminal prosecutions is a special factor militating against significant
judicial intervention even in the limited context of remedying systemic inadequacies. The
Nader court should have entered a declaratory order with a requirement that the De-
partment return to court and offer some evidence of steps taken toward implementation.
In fact, no remedy was ever ordered: the action was dismissed after being mooted by
repeal of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. Id. at 682. Extensive dicta in the case,
however, suggest the court would have agreed with the analysis just advanced. See id. at
679 and nn. 18 & 19, 681 and n.27, 682 and nn. 30, 31.
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the political branches for further consideration and might be ex-
tremely useful in highlighting the issues at stake.9
7
III. Implications of the Proposed Standard
Courts and commentators have thus far failed to examine the legal
propriety, foundation, and limitations of judicial intervention into the
federal administrative process by means of detailed enforcement in-
junctions." Such intervention is justified in law and policy when the
agency has systematically failed to execute a congressional mandate
that specifically protects a group of beneficiaries.99 There are, how-
97. See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957); Gewirtz, supra note 18, at 76-77.
98. See White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978)
(court considers only jurisdiction, mootness, and class certification); Adams v. Richard-
son, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (court considers only prosecutorial discretion
issue). The cases have not been widely commented upon, nor has any commentator in-
dependently addressed these issues.
99. Courts are formally empowered as well as functionally suited to entertain actions
alleging systemic enforcement inadequacies. Most suits brought to correct systemic en-
forcement problems would represent sufficiently concrete and adversarial cases or con-
troversies for courts to adjudicate under Article III of the Constitution. For example,
most such suits are distinguishable from Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), int which
the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs had an insufficient "personal stake" in the
case to justify federal jurisdiction to grant enforcement injunctions directed against state
officials. Id. at 372-73. Rizzo was an action brought directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)
and thus was fundamentally different from a challenge to some alleged systemic enforce-
ment inadequacy. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had a duty to "eliminate"
future police misconduct, id. at 376, but the Court found that no such duty existed, id.;
it did not, therefore, go on to consider whether that duty had been adequately ful:
filled. When plaintiffs complain that a general agency policy or practice inadequately
enforces a statute, however, it is clear that there is a "real and immediate" injury or
threat of injury. The injury is the inadequate enforcement itself. See Allee v. Medrano,
416 U.S. 802 (1974).
Furthermore, most meritorious complaints of systemic enforcement inadequacies will
meet the strict "injury in fact" test for constitutional standing outlined in Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426
U.S. 26 (1976). Warth was an action claiming that a town's zoning ordinance violated
the plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory civil rights; the plaintiffs were found to lack
standing because there was not a sufficient causal link between their injury and the de-
fendants' conduct. 422 U.S. at 508-09. Although the plaintiffs in Warth raised general
"policy" issues, they did so in the context of attacking the validity of a legislative enact-
ment. Where plaintiffs seek instead to have such an enactment enforced, there is pre-
sumptive causality once injury-in-fact is shown. Cf. White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252,
1257 n.25 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908
(1978) (distinguishing restrictive interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970) in Wein-
berger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), on basis that plaintiff there sought jurisdiction to
make "substantive attack upon the statute'). The very existence of a federal statute
indicates congressional recognition of the plaintiffs' interest and of the fact that enforce-
ment is necessary for the realization and protection of that interest Congress cannot, of
course, merely by express statutory language grant standing in circumvention of the
Article III case-or-controversy limitation. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346
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ever, important constitutional and prudential limitations on this
power. The proposed standard is one that preserves limiting considera-
tions as vital constraints on the court's exercise of its equitable powers
in determining the scope and specificity of the relief to be afforded.
Moreover, adoption of the proposed standard will result in a number
of institutional and equitable benefits.
A. Respect for Limits on Courts
The remedial standard proposed in this Note comports with the
basic constitutional and prudential limitations on judicial intervention
in administrative decisionmaking. The main constitutional constraint
on such intervention flows from the separation-of-powers doctrine.
Under that doctrine, courts cannot dictate to agencies what the result
of their actions must be when the law is applied to specific facts.' 00 The
(1911). However, the existence of a case or controversy is measured against the standard
of congressionally created interests. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
Simon presented essentially a claim of systemic inadequate enforcement, and thus is
much more relevant than Warth. The Simon plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, by
adopting a revenue ruling in violation of the tax code, "'encouraged"' hospitals to deny
services to indigents. 426 U.S. at 42. The Court, however, interpreted their claim as
alleging a particularized harm rather than a systemic one. The Court found the alleged
injury to be denial of hospital services, id. at 42-43, rather than interference with the
plaintiffs' "'opportunity and ability'" to receive medical services. Id. at 47 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting). The Court then found that the plaintiffs
lacked standing because there was not a sufficient causal connection between the injury
alleged and the conduct challenged. Id. at 42-43, 45.
When an agency delays a benefit, as in White, or fails to enforce a statute that
would directly profit the protected class, as in Adams, there is sufficient actual injury to
guarantee standing to members of the affected class. Plaintiffs will be able to show
easily that agency enforcement would remove the detriment to the protected class.
Allegations that administrative breakdown systematically denies a protected class its
statutory benefits would seem a far cry from Simon's gloomy description of the "'remote
possibility, unsubstantiated by allegations of fact, that [the plaintiffs'] situation might
have been better had [the defendants] acted otherwise, and might improve were the
court to afford relief.'" Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26,
44 (1976) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 507 (1975)).
100. See Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (distinguishing between
compelling exercise of prosecutorial discretion and compelling particular prosecution);
4 K. DAvis, ADmINISTRATIVE LkW TREATIsE § 30.11 (1958) (courts may substitute judgment
"on important generalizations but not on narrow applications"); Note, Dunlop v.
Bachowski and the Limits of Judicial Review under Title IV of the LMRDA: A Proposal
for Administrative Reform, 86 YALE L.J. 885, 901 & n.62 (1977).
The doctrine of separation of powers also prevents courts from deciding "political
questions" that are more properly the province of agencies or the Congress. See Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) ("several formulations which vary slightly according to the
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has
one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of
powers"). Yet the guidelines in Baker that most directly implicate separation-of-powers
concerns are facially less applicable to claims of systemic enforcement inadequacies than
to traditional challenges to executive actions. There is in the systemic context no need
for an "initial policy determination" better left to the political branches. Id. (emphasis
supplied). By hypothesis there has already been an initial agency attempt at implementa-
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suggested standard defers to the administrative process in such factual
decisions and concentrates instead on enforcement guidelines. The
most extensive remedy, a detailed enforcement injunction, is invoked
only in the most compelling cases, those in which the executive "takes
measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress." 101
More important are the prudential limitations emanating from the
separation-of-powers and political-question doctrines. Extensive reme-
dies should not be ordered when there are no "judicially discoverable
or manageable standards."'1 2 The proposal in this Note would derive
such standards directly from the congressional entitlement and supple-
tion. There is no "unusual need for unquestioning adherence" to a policy or practice
that has proved itself woefully inadequate. Id. Fihally,. the court does not express a
"lack of respect" or risk "embarassment from multifarious pronouncements" when it acts
to ensure fulfillment of basic congressional mandates. Id.
101. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Although Youngstown involved the question of whether the executive's
actions constituted a violation of law, the same considerations of separation of powers
are relevant in determining whether broad equitable relief may be entered against the
executive after it is established that a violation of law exists.
102. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Although the courts in Adams, Veneman,
and White arguably made certain missteps in fashioning remedies, such errors do not in-
dicate that no theoretically manageable standards existed. One problematic decision by
the Adams court, for example, was its requirement that complaints from different
minority groups be handled in proportion to the total number of complaints received
from each group. See Adams %. Mathews, No. 3095-70 11(c) (D.D.C. June 14, 1976).
Underlying this provision was an erroneous assumption that the number of formal com-
plaints filed accurately reflected the relative incidence of rights violations among different
minorities. The 1977 modification of the order specifically recognized the varying litigious-
ness of different minorities and directed HEW to use compliance reviews in order to
compensate for it. See Adams v. Califano, No. 3095-70 19 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 1977). This
initial error in remedy construction, however, does not suggest that the court exceeded
the bounds of its competence or discretion. Rather, the initial misstep was likely due to
the court's failure to consider its actions openly. This in turn can probably be traced to
a judicial sensitivity and overcautiousness regarding its role and the appropriateness of
its decisions. Cf. 0. Fiss, supra note 21, at 36 ("political considerations" and "ambivalence
toward the underlying decree" might affect court's remedial posture). Moreover, the
court was at least quick to right its mistake once that mistake became evident. Given
the pervasive bad faith on the part of the agency, elaborate specification by the court was
highly preferable, even if it did involve some trial-and-error.
Finally, there is no indication that, even in the absence of bad faith, HEW would have
been able to implement Title VI without making the very same mistakes that the Adams
court did. Had HEW been sensitive to the varying litigiousness of different minority
groups and been able to foresee the inequality that would result from the court's ex-
clusive reliance on pro rata complaint investigation, it could easily have brought these
points to the court's attention. There is no indication whatever that the court would not
have been receptive to such a presentation, or that it would not have modified its decree
accordingly. In fact, the court's concern for adequate enforcement, as reflected in other
provisions of its order, and its speed in modifying its order once the problem became
evident, both indicate that the court would have been very receptive to input from
HEW. If anything, the experience with the 1976 order highlights HEW's failures-
failures to anticipate enforcement problems and act to prevent them-and thus reinforces
the Adams court's basic role. Cf. p. 426 supra (discussing remedial errors and hesitant pos-
ture of Veneman court); note 93 supra (discussing questionable aspect of White order).
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mental regulations according to traditional principles of statutory in-
terpretation. The standard implicitly recognizes that statutes that clear-
ly vest important rights in a protected class of beneficiaries can yield
such guidelines, though laws creating only generalized expectations to
no particular class of beneficiaries are less able to do so.
The restriction of broad relief to cases of systemic enforcement in-
adequacies helps ensure that prudential notions of separation of powers
are respected: agency discretion will not be unduly intruded upon, and
practical problems will not overwhelm the courts. These dual goals are
further served by restricting, in accordance with the standard proposed
in this Note, broadest relief to cases in which agency elimination of
the enforcement inadequacy is unlikely or the nature of the group right
is especially pressing.
Two functional problems should make courts cautious about in-
tervening to too great an extent in agency operations by means of en-
forcement injunctions. First, premature judicial intervention might
intrude on agency autonomy and expertise. Courts should give the
agency a chance to respond in good faith unless there is reason to
believe that the agency cannot or will not do so. Under the proposed
standard, every opportunity is given the agency to remedy the problem
in its own way. The suggested approach leaves the executive with as
much discretion as is consistent with the judicial duty to protect in-
dividual rights. The basic role of the court is "to assure that the agency
properly construes its statutory obligations, and that the policies it
adopts and implements are consistent with those duties and not a nega-
tion of them."1°  The principle of phasing guarantees that the agency
will be given flexibility in its response, except in cases of the greatest
remedial need. And the latter cases are precisely those in which def-
erence to the agency should be "at its lowest ebb."' 0 4
Second, overseeing implementation of highly detailed enforcement
injunctions could place significant strain on finite judicial resources,
although such use of resources is often justifiable when large groups of
statutory beneficiaries are involved. The standards proposed for the
specificity of the initial order and for the use of phasing would mini-
mize court involvement in the operational decisions best made by the
agencies themselves. Although some monitoring of compliance is of
course necessary as a part of systemic relief, the general nature of the
issues presented in such litigation allows the courts to avoid the exten-
103. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1163-64 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
104. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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sive participation in daily administration that causes most concern. 1 5
Moreover, the courts in Adams, Veneman, and White all imposed time
frameworks indicating that they contemplated only a temporary
monitoring role for the courts. The standard proposed in this Note
similarly contemplates a temporary role: court intervention ceases as
soon as agency elimination of the enforcement inadequacy appears
probable.
B. Benefits
In addition to entailing explicit, principled recognition of the
limitations on extensive judicial oversight of the federal administrative
process, the proposed standard would be advantageous, at the very
least, in forcing courts to explore and articulate the reasons for grant-
ing broad enforcement injunctions. The legitimacy of judicial action,
as well as the evolution of more precise rules, depends on such articula-
tion.10 6 Moreover, the standard would serve two further goals: it would
guarantee extensive and effective judicial action in cases in which the
violation of individual rights or the statutory mandate is the most
serious, and it would create a useful dialectic to stimulate agency self-
reform and greater sensitivity to efficient utilization of agency re-
sources.
1. Appropriate Judicial Remedy
The restriction of broad relief to cases of systemic inadequacy in
agency enforcement would help ensure effective use of judicial re-
sources. Granting relief in such cases would obviate the need for nu-
merous individual administrative and judicial challenges involving es-
sentially identical legal and factual issues,10 7 challenges that would
be burdensome on agencies and courts alike. Thus, by entertaining
actions alleging systemic enforcement inadequacies, courts may well
facilitate the administrative process as well as preserve limited judicial
resources.
105. See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 39; Too Much Law?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1977 at 42,
col. 1. Courts have often ordered large-scale institutional reform and administered
their decrees quite successfully. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)
(reform in operation of Alabama state mental health institution); Morales %. Turman,
383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (reform of juvenile justice system in Texas). Although
there are substantial practical problems associated with affording such relief, they do not
for the most part afflict the court providing relief from systemic enforcement inade-
quacies.
106. See Note, Protective Orders Against the Press and the Inherent Powers of the
Courts, 87 YAL UJ. 342, 371 (1977).
107. This would be consistent with federal judicial policy as reflected in the class
action provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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Moreover, courts will be most active in the most appropriate cases,
namely those presenting the greatest remedial need. Under the stan-
dard advanced in this Note, important individual rights-constitutional
rights, civil rights, liberty interests, and entitlements to the physical
necessities of life-will be vindicated. Furthermore, these rights will be
vindicated for large numbers of people.' 08
Second, the proposed standard will.be most protective of these im-
portant individual rights in cases in which the agency itself is not ex-
pected to act effectively. If the nonenforcement or delay is systemic,
there is a greater chance that the defect is fundamental or that there is
bad faith. Judicial oversight of the agency in such circumstances is both
more necessary and, given the general nature of the issues presented,
more feasible. Finally, insofar as our constitutional system of checks
and balances embraces an active judicial role to protect legislative man-
dates against executive nonenforcement, 109 systemic enforcement in-
adequacies would seem to be optimal cases for extensive judicial
activity, because they are the most serious violations of legislative com-
mands. The proposed standard, tied as it is to statutory purposes, will
protect congressional mandates from being ignored.
2. Dialectic of Reform
Adoption of the principles of this Note will contribute to the crea-
tion of a forced dialogue of reform among courts, agencies, Congress,
and, not least importantly, statutory beneficiaries. The proposed stan-
dard envisions the fundamental role for the courts as initiating the
dialogue when systemic enforcement inadequacy is found to exist,
forcing the dialogue to continue if it fails initially to solve the problem,
and encouraging creative, constructive solution in the end. Sometimes,
as in Adams, the court will dominate the discussion, because of serious
insufficiency of the agency's enforcement efforts. In other instances,
rather than merely resolving the specific issues of the case, the court
will stimulate greater agency self-reform. In fact, the mere initiation of
suit may trigger or accelerate such reform." 0
108. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
result); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1072, 1083 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 3142 (1978) (No. 77-926); Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147,
1154 (10th Cir. 1974).
109. See Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 77
(D.D.C. 1973) (no executive discretion to refuse to execute laws; executive enjoined from
dissolving Office of Economic Opportunity).
110. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 259 n.5 (1970). In the two years between
initiation of the Veneman litigation and actual entry of judgment, the FDA increased
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Finally, in some cases, the dialogue will include Congress as well as
the agency. Appropriate use of the injunction to secure additional
resources will force congressional and high-level executive considera-
tion of basic issues of entitlement and implementation. Similarly, ap-
propriate issuance of detailed enforcement decrees will force Congress
to confront more details of administration in cases in which adequate
agency action seems unlikely or the nature of the group right is espe-
cially pressing. Heightened congressional deliberation and specifica-
tion will in turn contribute to the dialectic of reform.
manpower working on safety and efficacy reviews more than tenfold, apparently in direct
response to the suit. See Rogovin, Public Interest Law: The Next Horizon, 63 A.B.A.J.
334, 337 (1977). By one assessment, the suit "resulted in the FDA's timetable being re-
duced from forty years to four" even before the decision was handed down. Id.
